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   Accounts of modern Thai history have traditionally often been influenced by two highly influential nor-
mative viewpoints, which are that the Thai monarchy (especially since the mid-nineteenth century) has 
been singularly responsible for guiding the course of Thailand’s successful transformation into a modern 
nation-state, and that Thai Buddhism is something that can be wholly separated from socio-political life 
and any departure from this model represents a novel corruption.  This essay serves as a critical examina-
tion of these two pervasive narratives within Thai historiography, with a particular emphasis on exploring 
the underlying discursive trends that led to the rise of these two dominant paradigms.  Furthermore, the 
following discussion highlights attempts by a more recent generation of scholars to offer a critical re-as-
sessment of these “master-narratives,” thereby challenging the conclusions to which they lead.  !
   It is sometimes said within the field of philosophy of 
science that all data is theory-laden.  If this is true – 
and there is a powerful argument to be made that it is – 
then the implication of this axiom for historiography is 
that there is probably no way of presenting historical 
information that is in all ways neutral and free from the 
influence of certain dominant discursive pressures. 
This is certainly true in the case of histories of Thai-
land.  In the “Prologue” to his book, Seditious Histo-
ries: Contesting Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts, for 
example, Craig Reynolds asserts that, “in the Thai 
public square there is no such thing as disinterested 
history.”   Within Thai historiography certain themes 1
or “master-narratives” have traditionally served as or-
ganizing principles that dictate the manner in which 
information is presented in order to either implicitly or 
explicitly advance certain agendas.  In this essay, sever-
al relatively recent monographs concerning Thai histo-
ry, religion, society, and politics will be examined with 
an eye towards looking at how themes prominent with-
in Thai studies are being re-assessed by scholars who 
have an interest in looking beyond history as it is sup-
posed to have been, and finding new interpretive lenses 
with which to illuminate new and understudied aspects 
of the historical record.  In particular, this discussion 
will focus on two “ideal forms” within Thai historiog-
raphy.  The first is the notion that the operative agent 
in the formation of the modern Thai nation was the 
benevolent, Herculean, and enlightened leadership of 
Thai kings.  The second is the idea of normative Thai 
Buddhism being a religious tradition unsullied by con-
tact with the mundane world of politics.  With respect 
to these two themes, it will be shown that although 
powerful forces exist within both of these areas that 
encourage specific kinds of histories to be written and 
certain interpretative angles to be employed, important 
work is being done to challenge the validity of some of 
the traditional master-narratives of Thai history and 
open up new avenues of interpretive hermeneutics 
from which there is much to be gained. 
The Centrality of the Monarchy in the 
Emergence of the Modern Thai 
Nation 
One of the most obvious factors that sets the nation 
of Thailand apart from all other nations in Southeast 
Asia is the fact that it was never formally colonized by a 
European power, and thus the process of moderniza-
tion in Thailand was not driven by a series of colonial 
viceroys ruling on behalf of a foreign government. 
Rather, the process was driven by forces from within. 
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Within traditional Thai histories, although a number of 
different factors are presented as converging to allow 
the modernization process to take place, it is very 
clearly the Thai monarchy that is given primary credit 
for masterminding a plan for the “native” moderniza-
tion of Thailand and then carrying it to fruition.  In 
particular, kings Mongkut and Chulalongkorn are sin-
gled out for the reform programs that they initiated, 
which not only allowed Thailand to begin to develop a 
semi-modern infrastructure and enter successfully into 
the international market economy, but also succeed in 
helping to navigate the Thai nation between the Scylla 
of French colonialist ambitions on the one side and the 
Charybdis of British imperial designs on the other.  In 
Thailand: A Short History, David Wyatt describes the 
Kingdom of Siam’s situation in the mid-nineteenth 
century in these terms: 
The kingdom thus confronted three issues: internal 
integration, external territorial losses, and the sur-
vival of an independent Siam.  The outcome was a 
product of political developments centering around 
the Bangkok court.  Everything depended on the 
two men who were kings of Siam during the years 
from 1851 to 1910, Mongkut and his son Chula-
longkorn.  It was on their shoulders that the bur-
dens fell; it was they who had to make the difficult 
decisions.  2
Broadly speaking, this type of description is fairly 
typical within traditional Thai historiography.  Such 
narratives not only give a great deal of agency to 
Mongkut and (particularly) Chulalongkorn in actualiz-
ing the transformation that Siam underwent in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but also tend 
to present the Thai monarchs as being something akin 
to political geniuses whose singular prescience and 
wisdom allowed them to succeed against seemingly 
impossible odds where all other Southeast Asian mon-
archs had failed. 
There is much about this particular interpretation of 
Thailand’s development into a modern nation-state 
that might benefit from further scrutiny, as it would 
seem to be influenced by the employment of a pro-
monarchy interpretive lens that seeks to valorize the 
role of the Chakri dynasty in achieving the successes 
that Thailand attained.  Before beginning to decon-
struct this narrative, however, it is important to note 
that although it is crucial to recognize and rethink the 
influence of the royalist “master-narrative” on the writ-
ing of Thai history, it is equally important not to 
“throw the baby out with the bath water.”  Quite sim-
ply, any history of the development of modern Thailand 
that fails to include an account of the critical role that 
the monarchy played – or fails to note the remarkable 
achievements and influence of Mongkut and Chula-
longkorn – would be patently absurd. 
However, there may be a sense that accounts of Thai 
history painting modern members of the Chakri dy-
nasty as being driven in all of their actions only by 
benevolence and selfless concern for the Thai nation 
may need to be amended in light of new evidence. 
Maurizio Peleggi argues that up until the last few 
decades, Western historians (he specifically mentions 
Wyatt) have been the unwitting heirs to a royalist his-
torical narrative constructed by Prince Damrong, 
which lionizes the Thai monarchy’s enlightened lead-
ership in bringing about what is characterized as a 
unique case of indigenous modernization and nation-
building.   Peleggi represents one among a new gener3 -
ation of scholars who question elements of this domi-
nant master-narrative by looking at the evidence avail-
able using new interpretive lenses. 
In Lords of Things, Peleggi draws attention to the 
fact that although figures like Mongkut and Chula-
longkorn were certainly driven in part by the need to 
answer the myriad challenges presented by the Thai 
nation-state’s entry into the world of international poli-
tics and economics in the late nineteenth century, this 
cannot be seen as the only motivation at play.  In a 
compelling and rather convincing analysis, Peleggi 
argues that one factor key to understanding the behav-
ior of the Thai royal family in this period is a shift in 
their own self-image.  The essential argument runs 
along the lines that after gaining some degree of expo-
sure to the royal families of Europe, members of the 
Thai royal family began to undergo a fundamental shift 
in identity.  The consequence of this shift in identity 
was that they began to see themselves as members of a 
larger class of world monarchs (Peleggi uses the evoca-
tive phrase “Victorian ecumene”) who were perhaps 
marked off from one another by differences of degree 
(for instance, differences in the amount of wealth and 
power enjoyed by each royal house), but were not fun-
damentally different from one another in kind.  The 
most readily apparent result of this identity transforma-
tion involved conspicuous consumption – the Thai royal 
family noted the fact that royal dynasties in Europe 
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used public displays of opulent wealth as identity 
markers, and thus followed suit.   
Peleggi notes that Chulalongkorn’s visits to Europe, 
for example, while often portrayed as diplomatic expe-
ditions wherein the king engaged in cagey political 
maneuvers designed to guarantee Siam’s continued 
sovereignty, might also be portrayed as shopping 
sprees, wherein Chulalongkorn hoped to mimic the 
zest for material acquisition displayed by European 
royals, and hence join their ranks.  Peleggi further 
notes that the royal family sought to project this new 
outward identity by commissioning photographs of 
itself wherein the Thai royals were depicted as a thor-
oughly “modern” family of individuals who were as 
much at home dressed in slightly altered suits of West-
ern clothing as they were striking noble, vaguely 
Napoleonic poses for the camera.  Peleggi’s overall 
analysis takes nothing away from the fact that the royal 
family was crucial in the stewardship of Siam through a 
critical time in its history, but he does succeed in chal-
lenging the notion that the national interests of the 
nation-state were the only motivational factors at work 
in their actions, as certain elements of self-interest 
were certainly at play as well. 
Other recent challenges to the dominant royalist 
paradigm of Thai historiography have come from dif-
ferent directions.  Within this new, revisionist mode of 
historical analysis, a broad agreement seems to exist 
that the singular centrality of the Thai royal family in 
shaping the contours of what would become modern 
Thailand must be mitigated somewhat.  Thongchai 
Winichakul’s seminal work, Siam Mapped, for in-
stance, demonstrates the degree to which the power of 
modern map-making and shifting ideas about the na-
ture of political space aided in the development of 
modern Thailand into the “geo-body” that it is today.  4
Although Thongchai’s work is certainly not an abject 
refutation of the notion that the royal family was pivotal 
in the construction of the Thai nation-state, he never-
theless does succeed in de-centering the central impor-
tance of the monarchy somewhat by demonstrating the 
discursive power that borders and margins (as indicat-
ed on maps) had in the development of Thai nation-
hood. 
Along broadly similar lines, Tamara Loos’ Subject 
Siam presents two major challenges to the aforemen-
tioned royalist master-narrative of Thai history.   First, 5
much as Thongchai focused on the conceptual influ-
ence of maps, Loos turns her attention toward the dis-
cursive power of laws in the formation of modern Thai-
land, and asserts that an analysis of the influence of the 
evolution of the Thai legal code presents a further chal-
lenge to the idea that the Thai monarchy somehow 
single-handedly dragged Siam into the modern world 
through the power of crafty political action and benefi-
cent charisma alone.  In essence, Loos argues that 
changes in the Thai legal tradition pertaining to family 
law had a pivotal role to play in the construction of what 
she describes as a distinctly Thai “alternative moderni-
ty.”   
More specifically, her second critique of the royalist 
master-narrative is that although Thai nationalists of-
ten take great pride in the fact that Siam/Thailand was 
never colonized by a European power, it would not be 
a true statement to assert that Thailand escaped the 
influence of European colonialism altogether.  On the 
contrary, by focusing on the phenomenon of “plural” 
legal systems within a given political space, Loos 
demonstrates that – in truth – Siam was both the victim 
and the perpetrator of hegemonic imperialism.  She 
argues that the success of numerous colonial powers in 
forcing Siam to accept certain extraterritoriality provi-
sions (wherein citizens of various “powerful” nations 
were not subject to Thai laws) must be understood as 
something akin to a type of colonialism, albeit a variety 
wherein benefits accrue to a dozen different colonial 
powers rather than just one.  Moreover, it is argued 
that these extraterritoriality claims were rhetorically 
predicated on the notion that Thai laws were barbaric 
and irrational, which, in turn, led to a drive to reform 
the Thai legal code in such a way that European powers 
would no longer feel uncomfortable allowing their 
citizens to be judged according the dictates of Thai 
law.   
As a further move toward establishing some level of 
equality with European colonial powers, Loos argues 
that Siam itself engaged in a program of imperialistic 
expansionism in the Patani region of what is now 
southern Thailand.  This was accomplished by bringing 
local leaders into Bangkok’s sphere of influence 
through the threat of violent force, and subsequently 
subjecting the Muslim-Malay population to a “plural” 
legal system vaguely reminiscent of the one which Eu-
ropean powers imposed on Thailand.  Along similar 
lines with Peleggi’s argument that the Thai monarchy 
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embarked on a program of extravagant spending be-
cause that is what the “modern” (read: European) 
monarchs – whose ranks they wished to join – did, 
Loos contends that Siam engaged in a variety of impe-
rialistic expansionism because that’s the kind of thing 
that “modern” nations – a group that Siam sought to 
join – engaged in.  Although one could perhaps make 
an argument that Loos may overemphasize the influ-
ence of legal discourse when making her larger points 
about Siam’s colonial status (that is, as colonized and 
colonizer), her book stands as an important addition to 
the growing corpus of critical studies of Thai history 
that challenge certain aspects of the prevailing royalist 
narrative. 
Setting aside the self-consciously critical re-assess-
ment of the royalist master-narrative of Thai history for 
a moment, there has also been some important work 
done on how the contemporary notion of Thai national 
identity (or “Thai-ness”) emerged in the context of 
Thailand’s development into a modern nation-state, 
and how this concept of “Thai-ness” has been de-
ployed by different groups in the service of advancing 
certain agendas.  As Charles Keyes notes: 
Since the reign of King Chulalongkorn...there has 
been a conscious effort on the part of the central 
government in Bangkok to bring all the diverse 
peoples living within the political boundaries of 
Thailand under its authority.  The assertion of this 
authority has been exercised not primarily through 
the use of force....  Rather, it has been asserted by 
emphasizing a set of national symbols that hold a 
strong appeal for the vast majority of the populace.  
At the center of this lies the monarch (phra maha 
kasat), upon whom the legitimate power of the 
state is based.  6
What Keyes points to here is the fact that even aside 
from any specific actions that the king takes, the office 
of the monarch itself is vested with a certain symbolism 
that has been used (along with Buddhism) in the inte-
gration of Thailand into a modern nation-state.  There 
is thus an important sense in which the “imagined 
community” (to use Benedict Anderson’s term) of 
Thailand has traditionally been oriented around the 
axial center of a conception of “Thai-ness” that promi-
nently features the king at its core.  This notion of 
“Thai-ness” has, in turn, been employed by elites in 
the discursive construction of the modern nation of 
Thailand.   
Walter Vella’s Chaiyo!: King Vajiravudh and the 
Development of Thai Nationalism is an interesting 
analysis of just this phenomenon.   Vella’s account of 7
the reign of King Vajiravudh cannot be characterized 
as containing as radical (or, to borrow Craig Reynolds’ 
term, as “seditious”) a re-interpretation of the histori-
cal record as can be found in the aforementioned books 
by Peleggi, Thongchai, and Loos.  In part, this is be-
cause rather than dealing with the legendary figures of 
Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, the subject of Vella’s 
book – Vajiravudh – is a man not always remembered 
in the fondest terms within traditional Thai historiog-
raphy, so the stakes involved in portraying him as a 
human being acting out of eminently human motives 
are not quite so high. Nevertheless, Vella’s analysis is 
interesting insofar as it portrays King Vajiravudh as a 
cunning pragmatist who recognized what he saw as the 
need for the development of a national esprit to unify 
the Thai nation, and then set about consciously con-
structing a nationalistic discourse that linked the three 
“pillars” of religion, nation, and monarchy together as 
the center of an essential “Thai-ness.”   
Vella argues that more than simply being a political 
leader and cultural icon, King Vajiravudh also func-
tioned as a kind of “propagandist-in-chief” who sought 
to establish an emotional connection between the pop-
ulace living within his kingdom and this feeling of 
“Thai-ness.”  Furthermore, Vajiravudh subsequently 
lionized militarism in defense of this “Thai-ness” as an 
inherent and commendable cultural value of the Thai 
people.   A cynic might point out that it would be hard 8
not to suspect an explicitly self-interested motive for 
Vajiravudh’s rhetorical elevation of Thai kingship to 
the very center of Thai national identity, given that he 
was the first Thai monarch of the modern era to have 
the legitimacy of his absolute rule seriously questioned 
(i.e. the failed coup of 1912), and thus had a personal 
strake in reinforcing the prestige of the office that he 
held.   On the whole, although the overall image of 9
Vajiravudh that Vella presents does not represent a 
direct challenge to the historiographical master-narra-
tive of enlightened Thai kingship, the picture that he 
presents of a talented yet plotting and reclusive human 
being attempting to willfully manipulate the Thai na-
tional character in order to meet certain nationalistic 
ends does not fit neatly within this royalist master-nar-
rative either. 
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Finally, despite the success that figures like Vaji-
ravudh achieved in constructing, deploying, and popu-
larizing a Thai national identity to be used in the ser-
vice of creating the imaged community of Thailand, 
some recent scholarship has called attention to appar-
ent failures of the discourse of “Thai-ness” to function 
as a source of unity throughout the Thai nation.  In 
Tearing Apart the Land, for instance, Duncan McCar-
go argues that one of the central problems involved in 
the recent rise of violence in the Malay Muslim-domi-
nated southern region of Thailand is that sufficient 
effort was never expended to include the residents of 
southern Thailand within a communal Thai national 
identity.   McCargo argues that: 10
Thai virtuous [monarchical] rule was predicated on 
the shibboleth “Nation, Religion, King,” but Malay 
Muslims understood all three of these elements 
differently from Thai Buddhists.  Mutuality be-
tween King and people did not work properly in the 
deep South.  For this reason, virtuous rule did not 
provide a sustainable basis for the legitimacy of the 
Thai state in the Southern border region.  11
As a consequence of this failure to construct a com-
mon national identity equally accommodating to ethni-
cally Thai Buddhists and ethnically Malay Muslims, the 
legitimacy of the king (and, by extension, the rest of 
the Thai state bureaucracy) to rule over the land was 
never properly established in Patani, leading the re-
gion’s Malay Muslim residents to resent what they see 
as political domination by an outside entity based in 
Bangkok.  In fact, pressure exists within the Thai na-
tional discourse not to portray the ongoing violence in 
the south as evidence of an identity conflict over the 
failure of “Thai-ness” to be inclusive of all of the na-
tion’s residents.  This is because – among other rea-
sons – such a portrayal might constitute an implicit 
acknowledgement of the failure of the original progen-
itors of this notion of “Thai-ness” – the royal family – 
to articulate a sufficiently broad and inclusive concep-
tion of Thai national identity.  There is thus a sense in 
which this unwillingness to see the trouble in Patani as 
a conflict over identity and political legitimacy can be 
viewed as a form of resistance to interpretations of Thai 
history and politics that are less than fully supportive of 
an interpretive hermeneutic that aggrandizes the uni-
versal, enlightened – indeed almost infallible – leader-
ship of the Thai monarch. 
The Role of Buddhism in Thai Socio-
Political Life 
Another prominent theme within the field of Thai 
studies involves controversy over the political role (or 
supposed lack thereof) of the Buddhist sangha within 
contemporary Thai society.  Here again, one is con-
fronted with certain dominant paradigms of thought 
concerning what Buddhism’s role in society ought to 
be, which must then be reconciled with the reality of 
facts on-the-ground.  For instance, within Western 
scholarship, a great deal of influence has been exerted 
by Max Weber’s contention that in its purest, “an-
cient” form, Buddhism is a “specifically unpolitical and 
anti-political status religion, or more precisely, a reli-
gious ‘technology’ of wandering and of intellectually-
schooled mendicant monks.”   One of the conse12 -
quences of Weber’s influential formulation of norma-
tive Buddhism has been that cases of the Thai Buddhist 
sangha exerting political influence within Thailand 
have often been portrayed as marked departures from 
the original function that true Buddhism played within 
society, which was to provide a method of retreat from 
the realm of the here-and-now, and offer a means of 
moving toward the “other-worldly” ideal of nibbana. 
Therefore, without much effort being put into investi-
gating the possibility that Buddhism in Thailand (as 
well as everywhere else) has always had a political di-
mension, a trend in scholarship emerged which em-
phasizes the novelty of the close association of the 
Buddhist sangha with the politics of the state.  More-
over, even for a later generation of scholars who saw no 
inherent contradiction in the marriage of Buddhism 
and politics in the Thai context, an assumption has 
often persevered that only certain kinds of political 
involvement are appropriate for members of the sang-
ha, and that anything that falls outside of these parame-
ters must be viewed as an aberration. 
As one example of the influence of the Weberian 
construction of Buddhism in the field of Thai studies, 
Yoneo Ishii’s Sangha, State, and Society: Thai Bud-
dhism in History takes Weber’s construction of what 
Buddhism essentially is to be a given.   He argues that 13
at its heart, Buddhism is a rationalistic tradition of re-
nunciation geared toward elites and consisting of tex-
tually-derived doctrines.  Moreover, he argues that this 
genuine Buddhism – which he calls “nibbanic Bud-
dhism” – is little practiced in contemporary Thailand, 
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noting that “the orthodox doctrines of Buddhism, 
those oriented to the otherworldly realm, hold little 
interest for the majority of Thais.”   What one is more 14
likely to encounter in contemporary Thailand, Ishii 
argues, are forms of the tradition that he describes as 
“kammatic Buddhism” (which centers on the genera-
tion of positive merit in order to improve one’s materi-
al conditions in future l ives), “apotropaic 
Buddhism” (which is concerned with warding off evil 
through the performance of magical rites), and a “secu-
lar” subsystem of Buddhism (wherein members of the 
sangha involve themselves in the education and moral 
development of the laity).  The implicit argument here 
is that any form of Buddhism that explicitly entails the 
involvement of the sangha in the socio-political world 
of lay people represents a departure from normative, 
doctrinal Buddhism.  Although Ishii’s contentions here 
are hardly uncommon for their time (Melford Spiro 
made very similar claims with regard to Burmese Bud-
dhism, for instance), later generations of scholars 
would come to argue that although a neat cleavage 
between “this-worldly” Buddhism and “other-worldly” 
Buddhism may exist as a theoretical construct, in reali-
ty there was probably never a time in which this distinc-
tion was strictly maintained.  Rather, it is probably the 
case that Buddhism has always had a significant role to 
play in the social and political life of individuals, which 
renders the idea of “doctrinal” or “nibbanic” Bud-
dhism being the one “true Buddhism” profoundly un-
helpful. 
However, having said this, Ishii notes that regardless 
of whether or not the involvement of Buddhism in the 
socio-political sphere represents a novel departure 
from tradition, the fact that Buddhism has a significant 
role to play in modern Thai politics is self-evident.  He 
notes that the history of twentieth century Thailand can 
be viewed as the history of the gradually growing al-
liance between the Thai state and the Buddhist sangha. 
Ishii argues that the Sangha Act of 1902 marks the 
beginning of what he calls “state Buddhism,” wherein 
the secular government of Thailand gained control 
over the structure and function of the Thai sangha, and 
began to use it as a tool to be deployed in the service of 
integrating the territories under the control of the 
Bangkok government into a single, modern nation.  15
Specifically, Ishii notes how the reforms instituted by 
the first Sangha Act marked the beginning of a period 
during which the Thai sangha was integrated into a 
monolithic entity, and a Thai Theravada “orthodoxy” 
was established by virtue of the fact that standardized 
tests (with definitively “correct” and “incorrect” an-
swers) were formulated for entrance into the higher 
ranks of the sangha.  In this way, Ishii paints a picture 
of what he characterizes as a transition from plural Thai 
Buddhisms to a singular Thai Buddhism.   16
In many ways, Peter Jackson’s Buddhism, Legitima-
tion, and Conflict represents a continuation of Ishii’s 
essential line of argumentation, except that he adds to 
Ishii’s analysis of the construction of “state 
Buddhism” (or what Jackson refers to as “establish-
ment Buddhism”) by further delving into an analysis of 
what he sees as the deconstruction of this unitary, state-
aligned Buddhism by certain reformist agents.   In 17
effect, he argues that the stranglehold on official or-
thodoxy that the Thai Buddhist “establishment” once 
held has been fractured in recent years (especially 
since the 1970’s) by the emergence of trends toward 
reform and factionalism.  Whereas in the first part of 
the twentieth century, the Thai Buddhist “establish-
ment” was the only religious institution capable of 
being seen as “legitimate” by the Thai populace, Jack-
son argues that this monopoly on legitimacy has been 
fractured in recent years by movements such as Santi 
Asok and Dhammakaya that challenge the singular 
authority of the establishment sangha and seek to find 
new ways to make Buddhism relevant to modern life 
and compatible with Thai middle-class values. 
Jackson’s analysis also represents an important de-
parture from the aforementioned Weberian construc-
tion of an idealized, other-worldly Buddhism, insofar as 
he takes it to be a given that Buddhism and politics are 
inherently related to one another.  He notes, for in-
stance, that although it is traditional within academia 
for a wall of separation to exist between the academic 
fields of religious studies and political science,  
…the retention of this theoretical distinction when 
studying Thai political and religious life, in which 
notions of sacred and temporal power cannot be 
categorically distinguished, can lead to a failure to 
appreciate the significance of the real and continu-
ing relationship between Theravada Buddhism and 
political activity in Thailand.  18
Significantly, Jackson does not present this connec-
tion between Buddhism and politics as some sort of an 
aberrant departure from the normative tradition. 
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Rather, he argues that Buddhism has an inherently 
political role to play in Thailand, and to ignore this fact 
would inevitably lead to an impoverished understand-
ing of both Thai Buddhism and Thai political life. 
In Buddhism and Politics in Thailand, Somboon 
Suksamran makes arguments very similar to Jackson’s 
insofar as he draws attention to the close relationship 
between the sangha and the politics of the Thai state.  19
However, Somboon identifies another source for the 
widespread misperception that Buddhism and politics 
do not mix (that is, aside from the aforementioned the-
oretical distinction between “this-worldly” affairs and 
“other-worldly” affairs that has been influential within 
the academy), which is, namely, the Thai sangha itself. 
Somboon asserts that because politics is seen as a 
“dirty business” in Thailand, the sangha has a vested 
interest in being perceived as holding itself “above the 
fray” of politics in order to preserve its own sense of 
legitimacy, and thus takes great pains to conceal the 
degree to which it is deeply involved in the political 
world of the here-and-now.  Moreover, Somboon con-
tends that the Thai state itself colludes with the sangha 
in the encouragement of this misperception that reli-
gion and politics do not mix in Thailand, because the 
reciprocal relationship between the sangha and state in 
Thailand is such that any perceived threat to the legiti-
macy of the sangha stemming from the revelation of its 
involvement in mundane, political affairs would have a 
deleterious effect on the legitimacy of the state as well. 
Thus, a close examination of the literature on the 
political role of the Buddhist sangha within the Thai 
state reveals an interesting point of congruence where-
in both the Weberian-influenced notion of normative 
Buddhism as being “other-worldly” in its ideal form, 
and a self-interested motive on the part of the sangha 
to conceal its involvement in political affairs so as not 
to tarnish its own image, have together produced a 
dominant master-narrative wherein Buddhism in Thai-
land is (wrongly) portrayed as being inherently apoliti-
cal, with exceptions to this rule being depicted as de-
partures from the norm.  This phenomenon can be 
seen as an example of what Charles Hallisey has called 
a productive “elective affinity” that exists “between the 
positive historiography of European Orientalism and 
some Buddhist styles of self-representation which 
shaped the manner in which research in Buddhist stud-
ies became organized....”   There is thus a sense in 20
which the work of scholars like Jackson and Somboon 
– both of whom highlight the inherently political aspect 
of Thai Buddhism in great detail – can be seen as a 
necessary and important corrective to misapprehen-
sions concerning the actual relationship between Bud-
dhism and politics in Thailand. 
Finally, another master-narrative – alluded to above – 
concerning the Thai sangha that probably deserves 
more scrutiny than it has heretofore received is the 
notion that up until the late nineteenth century, it 
would be more appropriate to speak of multiple Thai 
Buddhisms than a single Buddhism existing within 
Siam. In the wake of the reforms of the Sangha Act of 
1902, the Thai sangha became integrated into a 
monolithic entity that has only begun to experience 
fractionalization in relatively recent times.  Justin Mc-
Daniel’s Gathering Leaves and Lifting Words repre-
sents a challenge to this dominant paradigm.   He 21
argues that if one shifts attention away from the macro-
cosmic level of looking at the laws that were being writ-
ten in Bangkok, and instead actually examines the mi-
crocosmic effect that these laws were having “on-the-
ground” in monasteries around the country, it be-
comes clear that the nation-wide “integration” of the 
sangha into a unified entity marked by a single ortho-
doxy has been greatly exaggerated.  By examining the 
textbooks used for monastic education in northern 
Thailand in the early twentieth century, McDaniel is 
able to show that most individual temples were little 
affected by the monastic reforms of 1902, and contin-
ued to retain their own idiosyncratic (one could even 
say “heterodox”) systems of monastic education that 
did not fall in line with the new orthodoxy being pro-
moted by the sangha establishment.  McDaniel’s 
analysis demonstrates that although the official, “insti-
tutional history” of the Thai sangha has the distinct 
advantage of producing an analytically “neat” model of 
the creation of a universally-accepted Thai Buddhist 
orthodoxy, there is a degree to which this portrayal 
represents an outright fiction.  If McDaniel is correct – 
and his arguments are, indeed, quite persuasive – then 
the dominant model of a significant disjuncture be-
tween a “fractured” sangha pre-1902 and a “united” 
sangha post-1902 needs to be seriously re-examined 
in light of the fact that the Thai sangha was probably 
never as unified as the “institutional history” of the 
sangha has led us to believe. 
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Conclusion 
As the Marxist-influenced analysis of Craig Reynolds 
reminds us, when examining the historiographical 
record, we must not only pay attention to what is being 
said in the histories that have been written about Thai-
land, but must also examine why it is being said.  Cer-
tain socio-political entities (such as the Thai monarchy 
and the Thai Buddhist sangha) have a vested interest in 
history being written in certain ways. Perspectives that 
countervail the dominant paradigm are thus apt to en-
counter some degree of deep structural resistance.  In 
this way, certain dominant paradigms of thought – 
which have here been described as “master-narratives” 
– become entrenched.  Having said this, however, it is 
important to stress that although this essay has taken as 
its topic a critical re-assessment of some of the domi-
nant master-narratives operative within traditional Thai 
historiography, it would be naïve to suggest that the 
new generation of scholars examined in this discussion 
are immune to the influence of certain dominant para-
digms themselves.  As stated at the outset of this essay, 
it is probably the case that when it comes to history, 
society, and politics in Thailand (or any country), ut-
terly neutral presentations of facts devoid of underlying 
ideological agendas are a theoretical impossibility. 
Moreover, it might be argued that although one must 
be careful not to uncritically accept the truth of works 
of historical or political analysis written under the in-
fluence of various master-narratives, this does not 
mean that there is little to be learned from looking at 
the master-narratives themselves.  On the contrary, by 
examining, for instance, the image that Thai royalists 
wish to present of the monarchy’s role in the formation 
of the modern Thai nation, or the style of self-repre-
sentation that the Thai sangha endeavors to communi-
cate to the outside world, there is an important sense in 
which one places oneself in a position to understand 
and assess the underlying logic of the agendas which 
motivate these idiosyncratic presentations of history, 
and hence to better appreciate the cultural values oper-
ative in contemporary Thailand. 
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